Guteriano Neves
Introduction
If we frame legitimacy in the
context of fragility, this implies that fragile states do not have legitimacy
or at best only weak legitimacy from their citizens. Indeed, in order to
progress beyond fragility, fragile states must strengthen their legitimacy. But
the history of the developing world tells us that acquiring legitimacy has
proved to be a difficult pursuit. Even countries that have been independent for
more than half a century still struggle with political legitimacy. This article
discusses some issues related to political legitimacy in Timor-Leste by
critically reflecting on our experience since 1999, and the current economic
and political development.
Citizens’ Lack of
Ownership towards the State
In
Timor, a country that just went through foreign occupation and a pitted
struggle against foreign rule, political participation goes beyond the notion
of liberal democracy. During resistance, people across the spectrums of social
class, education level, and multiple generations participated in the struggle
to liberate their homeland from foreign occupiers. Many revolutionary organizations
existed during the struggle, but these groups were merely symbols that
facilitated the process. Therefore, reflecting critically on the struggle of
the Timorese people and the current state of development, our struggle toward a
common goal is embedded in the Timorese consciousness as a nation. This is the
factor that unites Timorese to imagine themselves as one nation, to refer to
Anderson’s “Imagined Community.” The positive implication is that people had a sense
of ownership and responsibility towards common goals because they felt that these
goals belonged to them and what they were doing was a part of achieving their
goals.
But
after the country finally won its independence the situation changed
dramatically. The United Nations led the international community in nation-building
in Timor-Leste, unraveling Timorese unity in the process, especially at the
grassroots level. Even the small number of elites found it hard to find space
for political participation. Many international efforts to “empower” the
community resulted in the erosion of existing local authority, which was driven
by the presence of a multitude of international advisors.
The
situation did not change much after the restoration of independence in 2002. The
process then came to be dominated by local elites, most of whom reside in Dili.
The failure of political parties to channel the aspiration of their
constituents in the development process means that political parties only had
real significance during election cycles and the parties became merely stepping
stones for elites to acquire power.
Before
the massive flow of oil money began flowing into state coffers, many NGOs
played the role of facilitating popular political participation on a small
scale, allowing the people’s voice to be heard through advocacy efforts. But
after the flow of petroleum money began in earnest, and as the state budget
increased, and the reducing of donors’ contribution, the influence of NGOs began
to shrink. On the other hand, the state, dominated by a few elites, grew more
powerful. In other words, the increase in oil money empowered the state, and at
the same time reduced the public sphere for political participation.
The
result for the Timorese people is that they find themselves marginalized
because their voices are barely heard and reflected in the development process.
Although it is easy to call this situation undemocratic, it is hard to swallow for
a society that just underwent a brutal popular struggle. It is like taking away
the destiny of the nation from them. This loss of their voice erodes their sense of
being part of a community. After losing their ability to participate, the Timorese
people feel that the process no longer belongs to them. This ultimately leads
to an erosion of the sense of responsibility of ordinary Timorese citizens toward
the social transformation of this new country.
This
is the lesson we should learn from our experience of nation-state building over
the past ten years. Although we have earned the praise of many international observers,
we still have to reflect critically upon our flaws at nation-building. There are clear lessons to be learned from our
own history.
Invisibility of the
State
The
modern state we intended to build is not an institution embedded in our
history, nor in the history of other third world societies. It is a relatively new
institution that comes to us through Western colonialism. Given its novelty in
Timor, it is hard for this new institution to claim legitimacy over citizens
who previously lived in small communities, and who acted according to
community-agreed upon norms and regulations.
Meanwhile,
as a post-colonial and post-conflict society, Timor is also facing
multi-dimensional problems. Some of these are high rates of illiteracy and
malnutrition, poor infrastructure, subsistence agriculture, land-ownership, law
enforcement, a culture of “Big Brother,” and many others. In this circumstance,
rather than monopoly over coercive power, as
Weberian notion of state suggests, the capacity of the state to solve
problems inherited by colonialism is what determines political legitimacy.
Thus, the expectation from the people toward the state is very high. The state
is expected to provide social services such as education, health, water, and
sanitation, to develop the economy, to build infrastructure, to protect
citizens’ rights. And the list goes on and on.
It
is common in the history of developing countries after independence. The
invisible hand of state is everywhere and state played part in every aspect of
the society. That was how the state made itself visible to its citizens and
fortified its existence.
In
Timor-Leste, after independence, we Timorese expected significant roles of the
state. We wanted the state to provide social services, health services, water
and sanitation, enforced rule of law, the protection of basic rights of its
citizens, public works, and so on.
But
these expectations have not been met, and of course, it will not take a short
time to fulfill them. State visibility has remained very low. Most of state
apparatus is located in Dili. Police, judges, prosecutors, civil servants, are located
in Dili. This is totally disproportionate because only about around 21% of
Timorese live in Dili, but most of public servants are centralized in Dili.
Consequently
in the districts, especially in the villages and remote areas, the state remains
almost invisible to citizens. Although health and education are frequently
criticized, in rural areas we see the state only when our children go to school
or when people receive services at community health centers. How can one
honestly speak of “state legitimacy” to these rural citizens?
Exclusive Economic
Growth
What
is important for Timor-Leste is to have an economy where everyone can
contribute to growth, everyone is part of it, and everyone can benefit from it.
Unfortunately,
this has not been the case since independence. Timor’s economy has been
dominated by an influx of international capital that came through foreign aid
and by selling the country’s natural resources. Through this, the state
finances all the large infrastructure projects, pays more than 40,000 civil
servants, and keeps the state machine functioning.
On
the other hand, the agricultural sector—the source of income for 75% of
Timorese—continues to decline 0.8% every year between 2002 and 2010. At the
same time, public sector, which employs more than 40,000 people, increased 1%
every year. Services and industry are still stagnant. (Source: Ministry of Finance statistics.)
This
tells a lot about the economic structure of Timorese society. First, it implies
that 75% of Timorese who depend on the agriculture sector are getting poorer
and more vulnerable to poverty incidence, whereas those involved in the public
sector are doing better. Second, it implies that 75% of Timorese are less
participative and less productive in contributing to national economic growth.
Consequently, people began to shift from agriculture sector and yet, hard to
find jobs in other sectors.
In
a country where the state does not heavily depend on exporting its natural
resources, the burden of the state to provide good services is very high,
because the state relies on citizens’ contribution in various forms. But in a
country like Timor-Leste, where the state’s domestically generated revenues are
only about 8% of state annual budget, the incentive for the state to provide
basic services is almost nonexistent. In the end, our economy is not a
participatory and inclusive economy, generated by Timorese. Rather, it is
driven by an influx of foreign capital from petroleum revenues. Politically,
since the state does not depend on Timorese citizens to finance and maintain
its apparatus, it does not feel that it has to be accountable to them. It does
not need to tax its citizens, not even the rich, because the state receives a
lot of money from petroleum revenues. Similarly, Timorese people do not view
the State’s money as belonging to the citizens of the country.
This
mutual lack of financial dependence might appear simple, but it has highly
detrimental effect. It erodes the work
ethic in the public sector because individuals lack a sense of responsibility
to their fellow citizens even though they get paid by the state. It erodes the sense
of belonging and responsibility of every citizen to contribute. And at the end
of the day, it changes the nature of the social contract upon which the modern
state is based.
Conclusion
When
we talk about political legitimacy, our own experiences provide us with many
lessons. Our struggle for independence was popular, participative, and
inclusive. Everyone therefore felt that they played a role and were part of a
process. However, since 1999, when we reflect critically upon how our
nation-state has been built, we find that lack of Timorese ownership and the
state’s lack of a visible presence outside of Dili, as well as the Timorese
economic structure are very exclusive. By highlighting these issues, we realize
that our structural issues undermine the political legitimacy of the state.
Lastly, in order to acquire political legitimacy, all of us have to work to
transform these problems
Author
is Researcher at Timor-Leste’s Presidential Research Center.
